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The Connection Between
Competitiveness and International
Taxation
MICHAEL S. KNOLL*
I. INTRODUCTION
Competitiveness is an often used, but rarely defined term.1  It has
been called a dangerous obsession2 and the hot-button issue in de-
bates over international tax policy,3 yet it lacks a clear and specific
meaning.4
Although it has been difficult to provide a precise definition of com-
petitiveness, that difficulty has not prevented the rhetoric of competi-
tiveness from informing debates about government policy and
ultimately the policies themselves.5  Governments find it hard to re-
ject claims from their constituents that local interests (for example,
businesses, workers, investors) are at a competitive disadvantage rela-
tive to their foreign counterparts, especially when the alleged disad-
vantage is seen as a result of government policies (either foreign or
domestic).  For example, the Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax
Act (FIRPTA)6 was aimed at eliminating a perceived tax advantage
enjoyed by foreign investors who purchased U.S. real estate at “fire
* Theodore K. Warner Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Professor of
Real Estate, the Wharton School, Co-Director, Center for Tax Law and Policy, University
of Pennsylvania.  I thank Al Dong and Daniel Janovitz for assistance with the research.
The first draft of this Essay was written while the author was the 2011 John Raneri Atax
Fellow at the Australian School of Business, University of New South Wales.
1 See Paul De Grauwe, Introduction, in Dimensions of Competitiveness i, ix-xv (Paul
De Grauwe ed., 2010); Eckhard Siggel, Concepts and Measurements of Competitiveness:
Toward an Integrated Approach, in Dimensions of Competitiveness, supra, at 95, 96.
2 Paul Krugman, Competitiveness:  A Dangerous Obsession, Foreign Aff., Mar.-Apr.
1994, at 28, 41-44.
3 Daniel N. Shaviro, Decoding the U.S. Corporate Tax 133 (2008).
4 See Staff of the Joint Comm. on Tax’n, 102d Cong., Factors Affecting the International
Competitiveness of the United States 7-8 (Comm. Print 1991) [hereinafter 1991 Competi-
tiveness Report].
5 See generally id. (providing background information for a congressional hearing on
international competitiveness).
6 Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, § 1122, 94 Stat. 2599, 2682
(codified as amended at IRC § 897).
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sale” prices in the late 1970’s.7  Similar concerns motivated the 1986
branch profit tax provisions8 and the 1989 earnings stripping limita-
tions.9  More recently, Congress has taken to giving names to tax legis-
lation, such as the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004,10 that shows it
is trying (or at least wants be perceived as trying) to improve the com-
petitiveness of the United States.
The failure to provide a precise definition for competitiveness has
hampered attempts to provide a rigorous account of how international
tax policy affects competitiveness.11  Although policy advocates of all
stripes have evoked the concept of competitiveness in order to sup-
port one or another cause, there are two conceptions of international
competitiveness that are invoked over and over again in discussions of
international tax policy.  Moreover, as illustrated below, both of those
conceptions can be given solid economic foundation.  In addition
those two conceptions closely track well-known positions that are part
of a fifty-year-old debate on international taxation and a twenty-year-
old debate on foreign investment.  Before describing how the term
“competitiveness” is used in the context of discussions of international
tax policy, in the next Part I briefly describe and discuss the broader
economic literature on competitiveness.
II. ECONOMISTS USE OF THE TERM “COMPETITIVENESS”
Economists often speak of efficiency, or comparative advantage, or
more narrowly of (an advantage in) marginal production costs or the
cost of capital, but rarely do they speak of competitiveness.12  None-
theless, in recent years, a small group of economists have begun writ-
ing about competitiveness.13  And one conclusion that is clear from
their work is that there is no single definition of competitiveness that
applies in all situations.  Instead, different definitions of competitive-
ness fit better in different circumstances.14
Frequently, the term “competitiveness” is applied at the national
level in order to make comparisons across nations.  For example, the
World Economic Forum and Institute of Management Development
7 Richard L. Kaplan, Creeping Xenophobia and the Taxation of Foreign-Owned Real
Estate, 71 Geo. L.J. 1091, 1092-95 (1983).
8 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1241, 100 Stat. 2085, 2576 (codified as
amended at IRC § 884).
9 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 6202, 103 Stat.
2106, 2330 (codified as amended at IRC § 163(j)).
10 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418.
11 See Siggel, note 1, at 95-96.
12 De Grauwe, note 1, at ix.
13 For a survey of their work, see Siggel, note 1, at 96-105.
14 Id. at 96.
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(WEF/IMD) annually publish their World Competitiveness Index.15
Like all such indexes, the World Competitiveness Index summarizes a
range of indicators into a single number.16  That number is a weighted
average of all the factors that go into the index.17  Of course, as with
almost any index, the choice of weights is suspect.  Another and more
fundamental problem is the absence of a theoretical basis for the fac-
tors chosen.18  Nonetheless, the WEF/IMD World Competitiveness
Index is highly regarded, widely cited, and regularly used.19  The prin-
cipal users of broad nationwide competitiveness indexes, such as the
WEF/IMD, are investors and lenders.  They use those indexes to help
set hurdle rates for investments and interest rates on loans, to decide
where to allocate their investment capital, and to assess the risk of
their portfolios.20
In contrast with broad nationwide conceptions of competitiveness,
narrower market-oriented conceptions focus on businesses and work-
ers operating in markets in competition with one another.21  Such
measures are generally created with an eye towards evaluating or aid-
ing government policy.  There is a wide variety of such indicators of
competitiveness.  That diversity is in part a response to the widespread
and divergent demand for such information.  Examples of market-ori-
ented measures of competitiveness include delivered market price, to-
tal cost in domestic prices, marginal and average cost of production,
unit labor cost, market share, revealed comparative advantage, do-
mestic resource cost, unit labor cost, full unit cost, relative unit labor
cost, and total unit labor cost at domestic prices.22
For the purpose of understanding how government policy affects
competitiveness, market-oriented definitions have several advantages
over nation-wide definitions.  First, because they apply to industries or
firms, rather than to whole economies, market-oriented measures are
more closely aligned with our intuitions about competitiveness.23  Sec-
ond, market-oriented measures are capable of being given a more
15 World Econ. Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011 (2010), available
at http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2010-11.pdf.  For a
detailed discussion of the WEF/IMD competitiveness index, see Xavier Salami-Martin,
The Economics Behind the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index, in
Dimensions of Competitiveness, note 1, at 1.
16 See Salami-Martin, note 15, at 13.
17 Id.
18 See Siggel, note 1, at 101 (noting the lack of transparency for the factors chosen).
19 Id. at 100-01.
20 See generally The Vietnam Provincial Competitiveness Index 2008, at 36 (noting how
private firms use the index to improve their investment decisions).
21 See Siggel, note 1, at 96.
22 For a discussion of these and other microeconomic measures of competitiveness, see
id. at 96-100.
23 N. Gregory Mankiw & Mark P. Taylor, Microeconomics 27 (2006).
352 TAX LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:
solid theoretical foundation because they can be integrated into stan-
dard economic models.24  It is, thus, not surprising that the two con-
ceptions of competitiveness that appear regularly in discussions of
how international taxation affects competitiveness are both market-
oriented definitions of competitiveness.  These two conceptions are
discussed in the next Part, but first I describe a famous, twenty-year
old critique of the rhetoric of competitiveness.
III. THE TWO CONCEPTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS
President Clinton frequently would say that each nation is “like a
big corporation competing in the global marketplace.”25  President
Clinton used that language because it resonated with the public.  In
Paul Krugman’s opinion, however, President Clinton’s simile was not
merely wrong; it was dangerous.26  In a famous article, Krugman ar-
gued that the rhetoric of competitiveness is frequently used by politi-
cians, not just President Clinton, to avoid addressing serious domestic
problems and to justify get-tough international policies that are likely
to do little if anything to address a nation’s real economic problems.27
According to Krugman, the analogy between nations and corporations
as competitors is fundamentally misplaced:
The idea that a country’s economic fortunes are largely de-
termined by its success on world markets is a hypothesis, not
a necessary truth; and as a practical, empirical matter, that
hypothesis is flatly wrong.  That is, it is simply not the case
that the world’s leading nations are to any important degree
in economic competition with each other, or that any of their
major economic problems can be attributed to failures to
compete on world markets.  The growing obsession in most
advanced nations with international competitiveness should
be seen, not as a well-founded concern, but as a view held in
the face of overwhelming contrary evidence.28
Krugman continued his assault on the analogy as follows:
[T]rying to define the competitiveness of a nation is much
more problematic than defining that of a corporation.  The
24 See Siggel, note 1, at 96-105 (describing a range of methods for measuring competi-
tiveness and noting the usefulness of market-oriented measures for evaluating and design-
ing economic policies).
25 Krugman, note 2, at 29 (quoting President Bill Clinton).
26 Id. at 41-48.
27 Id. at 29-30.
28 Id. at 30.
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bottom line for a corporation is literally its bottom line:  if a
corporation cannot afford to pay its workers, suppliers, and
bondholders, it will go out of business.  So when we say that
a corporation is uncompetitive, we mean that its market po-
sition is unsustainable—that unless it improves its perform-
ance, it will cease to exist.  Countries, on the other hand, do
not go out of business.  They may be happy or unhappy with
their economic performance, but they have no well-defined
bottom line.  As a result, the concept of national competi-
tiveness is elusive.29
Yet, in spite of the criticism leveled by Krugman and repeated often
by economists,30 the fact remains that non-economists, including
policymakers, business people, journalists and informed citizens, talk
about competitiveness regularly and take it very seriously.  It is, I be-
lieve, better for formally-trained economists to take the concept of
competitiveness seriously, to give it content, and to subject claims
about competitiveness to rigorous analysis than to abandon the notion
altogether so as to leave the discussion entirely to those without for-
mal economic training.31  For many years, the latter is what happened.
Economists following Krugman derided the notion of competitive-
ness,32 but noneconomists continued to discuss how government poli-
cies affected competitiveness.  Because economists were reluctant to
speak of competitiveness, they did not fully participate in those discus-
sions.  Accordingly, for years economists have ignored the connec-
tions between taxation and competitiveness.  These connections are
described next.
In the context of debates over international tax policy, the term
“competitiveness” is often used not as a characteristic of an entire na-
tion (as Krugman criticizes), but as a characteristic of an industry,
29 Id. at 31.
30 See, e.g., Roberto Cellini & Anna Soci, Pop Competitiveness, 55 BNL Quarterly Rev.
71, 97 (2002) (“the idea of any generalized applicability of ‘competitiveness’ [is] simply
meaningless”); Andrea Boltho, The Assessment: International Competitiveness, 12 Oxford
Rev. Econ. Pol’y 1, 15 (1996) (concluding that competitiveness in the long run is a vague
concept); Gillian Bristow, Everyone’s a “Winner”: Problemastising the Discourse of Re-
gional Competitiveness, 5 J. Econ. Geography 285, 300-01 (2005) (describing discourse on
competitiveness as ill defined); see also Robin D. Schatz, A New Rating of Economies
Holds Some Surprises, N.Y. Times, June 6, 1998, at D2 (“[Krugman] was not the only
mainstream economist to reject the competition metaphor”); The “C” Word, The Econo-
mist, Sept. 9, 1995, at 104 (quoting Paul Krugman’s claim that “real economists don’t talk
about competitiveness”).
31 See De Grauwe, note 1, at ix-x.
32 Kevin A. Hassett, R. Glenn Hubbard & Matthew H. Jensen, Rethinking Competitive-
ness 2 (Am. Enter. Inst. for Pub. Pol’y, Draft, Sept. 29, 2011), available at http://
www.aei.org/files/2011/09/29/HHJ%20Competitiveness%20-2.pdf.
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which is made up of firms, such as in the phrase “the competitiveness
of the U.S. aerospace industry.”  Competitiveness, then, is a character-
istic of nations only as it applies to an aggregate of firms from differ-
ent industries that are subject to the same regulatory system.  The tax
system then can affect competitiveness by affecting the ability of do-
mestic firms to compete with foreign firms.
In order to understand the connection between taxation and com-
petitiveness, consider, for example, the U.S. aerospace industry.  U.S.-
based and incorporated aerospace companies include very large com-
panies, such as Boeing, United Technologies, and Lockheed Martin,
and many smaller and mid-size companies.  The operations of many of
the major U.S. aerospace companies are not confined to the United
States.  The largest such companies are multinational corporations
(MNCs) with operations in many countries, and they sell their prod-
ucts in the United States and around the world.33  Those firms com-
pete for sales at home and abroad with competitors based in the
European Union,34 Canada,35 China,36 Russia,37 Brazil38 and else-
where.
As in other industries, U.S.-based aerospace firms combine capital,
labor, and technology to produce their product.  They hire workers,
which they combine with capital, to produce a product that they can
sell at a competitive price.  Those firms compete in the way that Krug-
man says firms compete (with perhaps a little leniency granted for
government involvement in the aerospace industry).
Taxation, in general, and the corporate tax, in particular, affects the
ability of such a firm to compete.  Taxation creates a wedge between
what a firm earns and what that same firm can return to its investors.
That difference is the taxes governments collect.
33 See, e.g., Philip M. Condit, Expanding Horizons:  Boeing’s Global Business Opera-
tions, Geo. J. Int’l Aff., Winter-Spring 2003, at 44.
34 European aerospace companies include EADS, BAE Systems, Thales, and Dassault.
European Aerospace Aircraft Manufacturers and Europe Aircraft, ezilonEurope, http://
ezilon.com/business/aerospace_and_defense/manufacturing/index.shtml (last visited Jan.
26, 2012).
35 Bombardier is a Canadian aerospace company.  See Bombardier, Canada’s Bombar-
dier (2011), available at http://www.bombardier.com/en/coporate/about-us/worldwide-pres-
ence?docID=0901260d8000ede1 (last visited Jan. 26, 2012).
36 Aviation Industry Corp. is the principal Chinese aerospace company.  See Ray
Kwong, Name You Need to Know:  Aviation Industry Corporation of China, Forbes (May
16, 2011, 9:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/raykwong/2011/05/16/name-you-need-to-
know-aviation-industry-corporation-of-china-avic/.
37 Russian aerospace companies include Oboronprom and United Aircraft Corporation.
Oboronprom, http://oboronprom.ru/en (last visited Jan. 26, 2012); United Aircraft Corpo-
ration, http://www.uacrussia.ru/en (last visited Jan. 26, 2012).
38 Embraer is a Brazilian aerospace company.  Tradition and Background, Embraer,
http://www.embraer.com/en-US/ConhecaEmbraer/tradicaohistoria/Pages/Home.aspx (last
visited Feb. 14, 2012).
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Moreover, the total amount of taxes that a company pays can differ
depending upon where that company is based.  Purely domestic com-
panies are subject to tax only in the state where they do business.
Companies that conduct business in multiple states are potentially
subject to taxation in multiple states.  Under longstanding interna-
tional tax conventions, the source state has the primary right to tax
and the residence state has the obligation to mitigate double taxation.
That mitigation is typically achieved by the residence state either ex-
empting foreign source income (often called a territorial or exemption
tax system) or by the residence state taxing foreign source income and
providing a credit for foreign taxes paid (often called a worldwide or
credit tax system).  If all countries adopt territorial taxation, then all
businesses regardless of where they are based will be subject to the
same tax system when they make a specific investment in a specific
location.  However, when some (or all) states adopt worldwide taxa-
tion, then companies based in different worldwide states will face dif-
ferent tax situations when making specific investments.  They will also
face a different tax situation than companies based in territorial states.
That is to say, if not all states are territorial, then taxation can affect
the ability of firms (and hence of industries composed of similarly situ-
ated firms) to compete with one another.  Specifically, taxation can
affect the ability of companies from different states to compete for
workers, capital, and investment opportunities.39  Viewed in this way,
a state’s industry comprises the global output of the manufacturers
based in that state.
There is a second sense in which the term “competitiveness” is used
in connection with tax policy.  That sense is based on the notion of
regulatory competition.  Regulatory competition is the idea that states
compete for investments and for people through their regulatory poli-
cies.  A widely recognized and ongoing example of regulatory compe-
tition is the competition between U.S. states over corporate charters.40
In the United States, a corporation is considered to reside in the state
in which it files its incorporation papers.41  States have an incentive to
encourage businesses to incorporate in their jurisdiction because of
the fees they pay to the state and the legal and other work they bring
39 Eric Toder, International Competitiveness:  Who Competes Against Whom and for
What?, 65 Tax L. Rev. 505, 509-10 (2012).
40 See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law:  Reflections on Delaware, 83
Yale L.J. 663, 668-69 (1974); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and
the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. Legal Stud. 251, 255 (1977).
41 Some countries other than the United States use a facts-and-circumstances approach
to determine where a corporation is based.  See Marco Rossi, Officials Grapple with Cor-
porate Tax Residency Issues, 49 Tax Notes Int’l 338, 338 (Jan. 28, 2008) (discussing the
Italian test of corporate residency).  Such an approach provides less certainty, but more
closely reflects the substance of the business.
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into the state.42  In the United States, Delaware is the leader in incor-
porations.43  It is the state of incorporation for more than one-half the
Fortune 500 and half of all publicly traded companies incorporated in
the United States.44
Another example of regulatory competition is tax competition.
States set their own tax policies, which can differ substantially.  These
policies can affect immigration, investment, and tax planning activity.
Generally, low taxes are seen as an inducement to invest and work in
a state, and high taxes are seen as the opposite.  In recent years, the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),
has taken a dim view of tax competition, especially of the policies of
very low-tax countries, which are often pejoratively described as tax
havens.45  Tax competition is the notion behind the second way in
which tax policy can affect competitiveness.
The two conceptions of competitiveness described above have dif-
ferent implications for how taxation affects competitiveness.  In addi-
tion, the two conceptions of competitiveness have different
implications for how the domestic industry is defined and for the
mechanism through which taxation affects competitiveness.  The first
conception of competitiveness focuses on how taxation affects the
ability of firms to compete in different locations.  Thus, the first con-
ception of competitiveness defines a state’s industry by the total out-
put (both domestic and foreign) of the companies based in that state.
In contrast, the second conception of competitiveness focuses on how
taxation affects the ability of states to attract investment and labor.
Thus, the second conception of competitiveness defines a state’s in-
dustry by the total output of that industry in that state without regard
to the nationality of the producing company.  For example, the U.S.
aerospace industry, then, is the total output (measured by value ad-
ded) in the United States by U.S.-  and foreign-based aerospace
companies.
Figure 1 illustrates these two definitions of the U.S. aerospace in-
dustry.  The first definition (total production by U.S.-based aerospace
companies) is given by the shaded rectangle entitled Total global pro-
duction of U.S.–based aerospace companies.  The second definition
(total U.S. production of aerospace products by U.S.-  and non-U.S.-
based aerospace companies) is represented by the rectangle entitled
42 See Winter, note 40, at 255.
43 See Delaware Division of Corporations, http://corp.delaware.gov (last visited Jan. 26,
2012).
44 Id. (noting that 63% of Fortune 500 companies and 50% publicly traded companies
are incorporated in Delaware).
45 OECD, Harmful Tax Competition:  An Emerging Global Issue 8 (1998).
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Total aerospace production in the United States and marked by hash
marks.
FIGURE 1
TWO DEFINITIONS OF THE U.S. AEROSPACE INDUSTRY
Total global production of
U.S.-based aerospace
companies
Aerospace
production
within the
United States
Aerospace
production
outside the
United States
Total aerospace
production outside
the United States by
companies based
outside the
United States
Aerospace companies
based outside the
United States
Total aerospace
production in
the United States
Aerospace companies
based inside the
United States
As is clear from Figure 1, there are two major differences between
the two definitions of the U.S. aerospace industry.  The first definition
(total global production of U.S.-based aerospace manufacturers) in-
cludes the foreign production of U.S.-based aerospace manufacturers,
which the second definition (total aerospace production in the United
States by all aerospace companies) excludes (the shaded rectangle and
without hash marks).  The second definition includes the U.S. produc-
tion of foreign-based aerospace manufacturers within the scope of the
U.S. aerospace industry, which the first definition excludes (the un-
shaded rectangle marked with hash marks).
Neither conception of competitiveness or definition of the U.S. in-
dustry is right or wrong.  Both conceptions of competitiveness are
plausible as are both definitions of the U.S. industry.  In addition,
both conceptions and both definitions are in regular use.  Moreover,
as discussed next, each conception of competitiveness and its associ-
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ated definition of the domestic industry implies a different mechanism
whereby taxation affects competitiveness.
Under the first definition, the U.S. aerospace industry is defined as
the global operations of the U.S.-based aerospace companies.  Under
that definition, the U.S. aerospace industry comprises all of the pro-
ductive assets owned by U.S.-based aerospace companies whether in
the United States or elsewhere.
Because the first definition of the U.S. aerospace industry keys off
the state where the producing company is based,46 the competition
between U.S. and non-U.S. aerospace companies can be visualized as
a competition to acquire control over productive assets located in dif-
ferent locations.  Aerospace companies compete to sell aircraft, not to
purchase assets.  Their ability to sell aircraft, however, depends on
their ability to acquire productive assets (and to hire workers) used in
the production, sale, and servicing of aircraft.  Under this view, the
various national aerospace industries compete, for example, to own a
plant in India.  Viewed from such a perspective, a national industry is
more competitive than its rivals if it acquires the Indian plant.  Taxa-
tion, then, affects competitiveness through its impact on the owner-
ship of productive assets.  Thus, the U.S. corporate income tax will
adversely affect the competitiveness of the U.S. aerospace industry if
it reduces the incentive for U.S.-based aerospace manufacturers—rel-
ative to their foreign competitors—to own productive assets.  If the
corporate income tax discourages U.S. firms from owning productive
assets, then the corporate income tax directly reduces the competitive-
ness of the U.S. aerospace industry; otherwise, it does not.
The U.S. worldwide tax system will affect the ability of U.S. firms to
compete with firms from other countries for foreign assets—assets lo-
cated outside the United States.  Taxation will generally provide firms
from countries with a worldwide tax system with a tax-induced disad-
vantage relative to firms from countries with lower tax rates and with
a tax-induced advantage relative to firms from countries with higher
tax rates when competing for assets located in those states.  Relative
to firms from countries with a territorial tax system, firms from states
with a worldwide tax system enjoy a tax-induced advantage when
their home state tax rate is less than the host state tax rate.47
Under the second definition, the U.S. aerospace industry is defined
as the total aerospace production within the United States without
regard to the nations where the producing firms are based.  The U.S.
aerospace industry, then, includes the domestic production of U.S.-
46 Under U.S. law, a corporation is based in the state in which it is incorporated.
47 The situation is more complicated when the foreign tax credit is limited and foreign
income is deferred.
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based aerospace producers as well as the U.S. production of non-U.S.-
based aerospace manufacturers.  Viewed from such a perspective, the
U.S. aerospace industry competes with other national aerospace in-
dustries where each nation’s industry is constituted by the aerospace
manufacturers based in that country.  Thus, the European aerospace
industry is the total production of aerospace goods and services in Eu-
rope by European-based and non-European-based companies.
Viewed from such a perspective, the competition that takes place
between the U.S. and European aerospace industries takes the form
of competition to produce more aerospace goods and services in each
location.  The corporate income tax, then, affects competition through
its impact on investment in aerospace production in different loca-
tions.  Thus, the U.S. corporate income tax reduces the competitive-
ness of the U.S. aerospace industry if it discourages investment in
aerospace production in the United States relative to investment in
such production abroad.48  If the U.S. corporate income tax discour-
ages production in the United States, then it directly reduces the com-
petitiveness of the U.S. aerospace industry; otherwise, it does not.  In
general, tax rates in a host state that are higher than rates in other
potential host states will tend to discourage production in the former
and encourage production in the latter.49
IV. TRACKING OTHER DEBATES
In Part III, I argued that for the purpose of understanding how tax-
ation impacts competitiveness there are two conceptions of competi-
tiveness that are regularly used in public discourse and that both
conceptions can be given rigorous economic foundations.  Moreover I
showed that each conception of competitiveness is associated with a
specific way of defining the domestic industry and a different mecha-
nism through which taxation affects the competitiveness of that
industry.
In this Part, I argue that these two ways of describing what it means
for taxation to affect competitiveness track the common intuition of
people who work in the field of international taxation.  I also argue
that these two views readily map into well-recognized positions in
longstanding policy debates.  That they track the intuition of leaders
48 If, however, all states have worldwide taxation with an unlimited foreign tax credit
and without deferral, then source state tax rates will not impact local production.
49 The analysis, implementation (especially the calculation of the foreign tax credit), and
policy implications are more complicated if a portion of the host state’s tax revenues is
used in a fashion that generates benefits for a taxpayer resident in another state that taxes
worldwide income.
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in the field can be seen by examining two U.S. government reports on
competitiveness that discuss tax policy at length.
A. Treasury’s 2007 Report on Competitiveness
In 2007, Treasury’s Office of Tax Policy released a 100-plus page
report that included the words “tax” and “competitiveness” in its ti-
tle.50  The report, entitled “Approaches to Improve the Competitive-
ness of the U.S. Business Tax System for the 21st Century,” was a
follow-up to a conference hosted by Treasury earlier that year.  Sur-
prisingly, although the Treasury report’s title suggests that the report
will examine the connection between taxation and competitiveness,
nowhere does the report provide a definition of competiveness.  Nev-
ertheless, the discussion in the report regularly and frequently tracks
the two definitions provided above.
The executive summary, for example, mentions both conceptions of
competitiveness in describing how tax systems can affect U.S.
competitiveness.
As other nations modernize their business tax systems to
recognize the realities of the global economy, U.S. compa-
nies increasingly suffer a competitive disadvantage.  The U.S.
business tax system imposes a burden on U.S. companies and
U.S. workers by raising the cost of investment in the United
States and burdening U.S. firms as they compete with other
firms in foreign markets.51
The two conceptions of competitiveness are also reiterated through-
out the text, often without clearly delineating between the two.  The
following passage is one such example from the report:
It is important to consider the effects of leaving the system
for taxing U.S. businesses unchanged while other nations re-
form their systems.  In general, inaction would make the
United States a less attractive place in which to invest, inno-
vate, and grow.  The impact of allowing the U.S. tax system
to stagnate and fall behind relative to other countries would
be modest at first.  The United States would see less benefit
from inflows of foreign capital and investment, and U.S.
firms would face a higher cost of capital than foreign firms,
making it more difficult to compete in foreign markets.  In
50 Treasury Dep’t, Office of Tax Pol’y, Approaches to Improve the Competitiveness of
the U.S. Business Tax System for the 21st Century (2007).
51 Id. at i.
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the short run, this would translate into slower growth, less
productivity, and less employment.
Over the long run, however, the impact of the United
States falling further behind its major trading partners is
likely to become more dramatic.  Industries that are rela-
tively large producers or users of capital goods would be
most affected.  American manufacturers, for example, would
find themselves especially disadvantaged by a tax code that
causes them to face a higher cost of capital than their com-
petitors in other countries.  In a world of greater economic
integration and increased trade and capital flows, a firm’s de-
cision about where to locate and expand its operations would
be increasingly influenced by factors such as a country’s cor-
porate tax code and overall investment climate.52
Thus, the 2007 Treasury Report invokes both the locational and own-
ership notions of competitiveness described above.53  Because the re-
port does not define competitiveness, however, it does not explore the
connections between taxation and competitiveness as rigorously as it
could have.
B. JCT’s 1991 Report on Competitiveness
Treasury’s 2007 report was not the first government report to dis-
cuss how taxation affects competitiveness.  In 1991, the Joint Commit-
tee on Taxation released a report that begins by noting that there is no
single commonly accepted and everywhere useful definition of com-
petitiveness.54  The report then goes on to offer three definitions
“commonly given to the term ‘competitiveness’ in recent writings on
U.S. economic policy.”55
The first definition, which is described in the report as trade com-
petitiveness, “is the ability of firms located in the United States to sell
their output in foreign markets and to compete in domestic markets
52 Id. at 5.
53 See Part III.  There is a third conception of how taxation can impact competiveness
that is sometimes mentioned.  It is the idea that a broad-based tax system that imposes the
same or nearly the same effective tax rate on activities across the board is more efficient
than a tax system that imposes very different effective tax rates on different activities.
Edgar K. Browning & Jacquelene M. Browning, Why Not a True Flat Rate Tax?, 5 Cato J.
629, 637-38 (1985) (stating that with a flat tax, resources are not shifted to lowered value,
but tax preferred, uses).  This is standard economic advice on designing an efficient tax
system.  That advice applies as well in closed economies as in open economies and so does
not focus on the connection between international taxation and international
competitiveness.
54 1991 Competitiveness Report, note 4, at 3.
55 Id. at 7.
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with output produced in foreign countries.”56  The second definition,
called standard of living competitiveness, compares the current U.S.
living standard with those of other countries.57  This measure focuses
on the productivity growth of U.S. labor and the saving rate of the
United States, because both of these factors affect future living stan-
dards.”58  The third definition, called multinational competitiveness,
“is the ability of U.S. multinationals . . . that locate production facili-
ties overseas to compete in foreign markets.”59
The second definition is the broadest of the three definitions of
competitiveness.  Although that definition contains an international
gloss by comparing standards of living across states, that language is
window dressing for what is otherwise a domestic concept.  Even in a
closed market, one with no economic connection to states outside,
government policy (including tax policy) can still affect living stan-
dards and growth rates.  In such circumstances, government policy can
improve living standards and growth rates by correcting for negative
externalities and by providing valuable public goods.  Government
policy can also reduce living standards and hamper growth by dis-
torting investments and other decisions.  This broad notion of an effi-
cient tax system, however, is unrelated to international transactions or
cross-border taxation because the same issue arises in a purely domes-
tic context.
Although the first and third definition of competitiveness do not
precisely match those offered above, there is a close correspondence.
The third definition is closely related to the ownership definition of
competitiveness.  Nevertheless, the ability of multinationals to com-
pete in overseas markets is not discussed in that report.  The first defi-
nition includes the concept of attracting capital investment,60 which is
the heart of the locational definition of competitiveness.  The location
of investment is a topic that the 1991 report covers in detail.  Indeed,
Part Two of the Report, contains an extensive discussion and analysis
of the effect of various tax systems on the location of investment.61  It
is, thus, worth noting that while both the 1991 and 2007 reports discuss
the impact of taxation on the location of investment at some length,
the 2007 report discusses the effect of taxation on ownership at some
length, whereas the 1991 report largely ignores that issue.  That over-
sight is consistent with the then–prevailing view of economists that
distorting capital ownership patterns would not have substantial ad-
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 8.
60 See id. at 9-10.
61 Id. at 232-68.
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verse welfare consequences.  The 1991 report was, however, a missed
opportunity for commentators to have started earlier to begin think-
ing rigorously about the connections between taxation and ownership.
C. The Debate over International Tax Neutrality Benchmarks
Since the Kennedy Administration, two neutrality principles have
dominated U.S. international tax policy and the debate over what that
policy should be:  capital export neutrality (CEN) and capital import
neutrality (CIN).62  Over the intervening half century, the United
States’ commitment to one or the other benchmark has swung back
and forth.63  The two ways that taxation can hamper the competitive-
ness of a domestic industry track closely those two neutrality
benchmarks.
1. The Normative Meaning of CEN
A tax system satisfies CEN if an investor pays tax at the same rate
on the income from an investment regardless of where the investment
is located.64  If all investors are taxed at the same rate, regardless of
where they invest, the location where investment occurs will not be
affected by taxes.  Accordingly the allocation of capital across states
will maximize output.  As Peggy Musgrave pointed out many years
ago, universal adoption of a worldwide tax system with an unlimited
foreign tax credit will achieve CEN.65
In the absence of an international tax system where all countries tax
their residents’ worldwide income and grant unlimited foreign tax
credits (the latter is widely recognized as politically infeasible and eco-
nomically cost prohibitive), the only other way to achieve CEN is for
states to harmonize their tax rates and bases.66  In the absence of such
62 For a short history of U.S. international tax policy, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, All of a
Piece Throughout:  The Four Ages of U.S. International Taxation, 25 Va. Tax Rev. 313
(2005).
63 See id. at 315-16, 324-25, 330-32.
64 The contribution that any asset makes to global welfare is a function of the before-tax
rate of return generated by the asset.  Thus, if the before-tax rates of return on the margi-
nal asset in each jurisdiction are equal, then global welfare cannot be increased by shifting
assets across borders.  In such circumstances, the tax system is said to satisfy CEN.
65 See Peggy Brewer Richman, Taxation of Foreign Investment Income:  An Economic
Analysis 5-6 (1963); Peggy B. Musgrave, United States Taxation of Foreign Investment
Income:  Issues and Arguments 74-75, 109 (1969).
66 E.g., Fadi Shaheen, International Tax Neutrality:  Revisited, 64 Tax L. Rev. 131, 131
(2011).
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harmonization, states with lower effective tax rates will have a tax-
induced advantage in attracting investment.67
Of course, the tax neutrality benchmark of CEN is closely associ-
ated with the second definition of competitiveness, which focuses on a
state’s ability to attract foreign investment.  An international tax re-
gime that satisfies CEN (that is, universal adoption of worldwide taxa-
tion with unlimited foreign tax credits) will place all states on an equal
footing in their ability to attract foreign investment.  Tax considera-
tions will not advantage or disadvantage any of them in their ability to
attract investment.
2. The Two Different Normative Meanings of CIN
Musgrave also discusses CIN, which she describes in the context of
business competition and expansion opportunities.68  However, the
economist’s conception of CIN is not that of Musgrave, which I dis-
cuss below, but a different notion.
a. Savings Neutrality
The economist’s view of CIN derives from an influential and impor-
tant article published by Thomas Horst in 1980.  In that brief article,
Horst formalizes and models some of the basic ideas developed in
Musgrave’s early writings.69  For example, Horst demonstrates that a
worldwide tax system with unlimited foreign tax credits, will not dis-
tort the allocation of capital across locations.70  Horst then demon-
strates that territorial taxation (that is, source taxation only or
equivalently the exemption of foreign source income from taxation)
will not distort the consumption-savings decisions across jurisdic-
tions.71  Horst refers to the situation in which the tax system does not
differentially distort the consumption-savings choice across investors
from different states72 as one in which CIN obtains.73
Horst shows that if all countries adopt territorial taxation, then the
tax system will achieve CIN as savings neutrality.  If some but not all
countries exempt foreign source income from tax, then the only way
67 To the extent that tax revenues provide benefits to investors (directly or indirectly),
the tax operates more as a user fee than as a tax and so might not discourage investment.
68 Musgrave, note 65, at 119-21.
69 Thomas Horst, A Note on the Optimal Taxation of International Investment Income,
94 Q.J. Econ. 793 (1980).
70 Id. at 796.
71 See id. at 796-97.
72 Income taxation distorts the consumption-savings choice.  E.g., Lawrence Zelenak,
Commentary:  The Reasons for a Consumption Tax and the Tax Treatment of Gifts and
Bequests, 51 Tax L. Rev. 601, 605-06 (1996).
73 Id. at 796.
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to achieve CIN as savings neutrality is for states to harmonize their
tax rates and bases.
Horst’s interpretation of CIN caught on in the economics litera-
ture.74  And so that interpretation is presumably what many econo-
mists have in mind when they say that a territorial tax system satisfies
CIN.  That, however, is not what Musgrave meant, and more to the
point it is not what many modern day legal scholars and policy ana-
lysts have in mind when they invoke CIN.
b. Competitiveness or Ownership Neutrality
As described in the previous Subsection, economists think of a tax
system that violates CIN as differentially distorting the saving-con-
sumption decision across taxpaying investors from different countries.
In contrast with economists who write about international tax policy,
legal scholars, lawyers, accountants, and other noneconomists who
write in the field have generally written about CIN in terms of the
ability of domestic and foreign companies and investors to compete in
a specific marketplace.  Thus, the second meaning of CIN is as com-
petitiveness or ownership neutrality.
Ownership considerations were first introduced into the economic
literature on foreign direct investment in the late 1950’s.75  That work,
which is now recognized as the foundation of the modern literature on
international trade, did not receive much attention at the time.76  Ac-
cordingly, for many years, economists ignored the importance of own-
ership in influencing foreign direct investment.
It was not until the 1980’s that economists again started to think
seriously about how ownership considerations impact foreign direct
investment.77  Even so, the rigorous economic analysis of ownership
remained outside the realm of international tax policy for some more
years.
In 1990, Michael Devereux coined the phrase capital ownership
neutrality (CON) to describe a tax system that is neutral with respect
to the ownership of assets.78  Devereux’s original paper on CON, how-
74 Michael S. Knoll, Reconsidering International Tax Neutrality, 64 Tax L. Rev. 99, 108
n.40 (2011).
75 See Edward M. Graham & Paul R. Krugman, Foreign Direct Investment in the
United States 191-93 (3d ed. 1995) (examining the historic development of economic
literature).
76 See id.
77 See id. at 192-93.
78 Michael Devereux, Capital Export Neutrality, Capital Import Neutrality, Capital
Ownership Neutrality and All That 2 (Inst. for Fiscal Stud., Working Paper, 1990).  The
term “ownership neutrality” appears to have first been used in print in a 1994 article by
Robert Green.  Robert A. Green, The Troubled Rule of Nondiscrimination in Taxing For-
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ever, was never published and the concept remained dormant for an-
other decade until Mihir Desai and James Hines, in a series of articles
published in 2003 and 2004, brought ownership into the forefront of
the professional economists’ literature on international taxation.79
Desai and Hines argue that productivity depends on the ownership of
assets so that a tax regime that distorts ownership will impose large
welfare costs.80  Their work has been very influential, although some
commentators question the magnitude of tax-induced ownership dis-
tortions and the data/measurements Desai and Hines employ.81
Yet, the idea of competitiveness or ownership neutrality is much
older.  When Musgrave used the term CIN she had competitiveness in
mind, not savings neutrality.  Thus, in her 1963 work, Musgrave in-
troduces the phrase “capital import neutrality” in the following sen-
tence:  “A form of capital-import neutrality under which all investors
who invest in one particular country are subject to the same tax treat-
ment, namely, that of the country of the source of investment income,
would allow all foreign investors in that country equal opportunities
for expansion.”82  Although Musgrave rejects CIN as the appropriate
welfare benchmark because it does not promote neutrality with re-
spect to the location of investment,83 the passage is clearly not about
savings, but is instead about competitiveness.
Similarly, in her 1969 work, Musgrave writes that business people
argue that “[t]he relevant concept of neutrality is equal tax treatment
of U.S. investors abroad and their foreign competitors (capital-import
neutrality).”84  And in a section entitled “Capital-import neutrality,”
Musgrave writes:  “Businessmen frequently maintain that neutrality
should apply between U.S. foreign investors and their competitors
abroad.  This view of neutrality, which may be termed ‘capital-import
neutrality,’ suggests taxation by source or exemption of foreign invest-
eign Direct Investment, 26 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 113, 138 (1994) (“Ownership neutrality
prevails if the international tax system is neutral with respect to the identity of the firm that
owns and controls capital in a given country.”).
79 Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines Jr., Evaluating International Tax Reform, 41 Nat’l
Tax J. 487 (2003); Mihir A. Desai, New Foundations for Taxing Multinational Corpora-
tions, Taxes, Mar. 2004, at 39; Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines Jr., Old Rules and New
Realities:  Corporate Tax Policy in a Global Setting, 57 Nat’l Tax J. 937 (2004) [hereinafter
Old Rules].
80 Desai & Hines, Old Rules, note 79, at 955-57.
81 Jane G. Gravelle, International Corporate Income Tax Reform:  Issues and Proposals,
9 Fla. Tax Rev. 469, 477-83 (2009); Harry Grubert, Comment on Desai and Hines, “Old
Rules and New Realities:  Corporate Tax Policy in a Global Setting,” 58 Nat’l Tax J. 263,
263-65 (2005); Mitchell A. Kane, Ownership Neutrality, Ownership Distortions, and Inter-
national Tax Welfare Benchmarks, 26 Va. Tax Rev. 53, 54-56 (2006).
82 Richman, note 65, at 8.
83 Id.
84 Musgrave, note 65, at 118.
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ment income by the United States.”85  Once again, Musgrave is skepti-
cal of the efficiency and fairness benefits of CIN, but there is no
ambiguity as to connotation.  CIN is about competitiveness, not
savings.86
Ownership neutrality, then, is a second meaning of CIN and it
seems to be the meaning intended by Musgrave.  It is also a more
intuitive meaning for the term CIN than the alternative meaning of
not distorting the consumption-savings choice across investors.  The
phrase “capital import neutrality” does not suggest anything about
savings.  Instead, the phrase suggests investment from abroad into a
host country in competition with local investors and the neutrality is
often expressed as occurring between a home investor and a foreign
investor or among foreign investors from different states.  In many
instances, the investors are assumed to be firms, not individuals, which
further strains the interpretation of CIN as dealing with the trade-off
between consumption and savings.  Also, both CEN and CIN are
often described as dealing with foreign direct investment, not portfo-
lio investment.  In a world where firms make direct investments and
individuals make portfolio investments, it makes little sense for CIN
to be about both direct investment and the consumption-savings
tradeoff. Instead, ownership neutrality—or something close to it—ap-
pears to be what many writers about tax policy who are not profes-
sionally trained economists have in mind when they use the term CIN.
Indeed, some prominent economists have referred to CIN as re-
lated to ownership.  Devereux, in a footnote to his 1990 paper intro-
ducing the concept of CON, writes, “[i]n my [Institute for Fiscal
Studies] report with Mark Pearson, we attempted to redefine capital
import neutrality to cover this concept [CON].  This may have caused
some confusion with what others have called capital import neutral-
ity.”87  As Devereux’s comment makes clear, economists have gener-
ally defined CIN in such a way that it differs from CON, even though
CON is a natural interpretation for the term CIN.  Also in 1990, Hugh
Ault and David Bradford wrote “‘[c]apital-import neutrality’ refers to
the nationality of ownership of firms.”88  Although they define CIN as
85 Id. at 119.
86 Although Musgrave’s use of CIN focuses on competitiveness, not savings, she does
not explain how businesses compete with one another to expand production.  That gap in
the argument might be a result of her rejection of CIN as a benchmark worth pursuing.
Nevertheless, modern corporate finance provides the link Musgrave did not by explaining
how firms compete.  They compete with one another for assets by raising money from
outside investors, which they use to acquire assets.
87 Devereux, note 78, at 2 n.4.
88 Hugh J. Ault & David F. Bradford, Taxing International Income:  An Analysis of the
U.S. System and Its Economic Premises, in Taxation in the Global Economy 11, 39 (Assaf
Razin & Joel Slemrod eds., 1990).
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essentially CON, they reject the idea that CON is an important wel-
fare benchmark:  “The nationality of the owners of capital is not gen-
erally associated with economically significant consequences (apart,
perhaps, from portfolio diversification).”89
The 1991 Joint Committee report illustrates the then-accepted view
of the economics profession that the welfare consequences of a tax
system distorting ownership were minimal.90  Consistent with the
then-prevailing (and still existing) view among professional econo-
mists that the welfare consequences of a tax system distorting the lo-
cation of investment can be large, the Joint Committee’s 1991 report
discusses the effect of taxation on the location of investment at
length.91  That report, however, discusses CIN briefly in the context of
saving neutrality and pays little attention to ownership
considerations.92
Of course, the tax neutrality benchmark of CON as well as the
benchmark of CIN (when the latter is understood as ownership neu-
trality) are closely associated with the first definition of competitive-
ness, which focuses on the ability of companies located in different
countries to acquire productive assets.  A tax system that satisfies
CON is one in which companies, regardless of where they are based,
compete on an equal footing in seeking to acquire productive assets.
Tax considerations will not advantage or disadvantage any of them in
their ability to acquire productive assets.
Thus, the two common meanings of competitiveness that are ex-
pressed in discussions of international tax policy correspond closely to
the two leading tax neutrality benchmarks.  Those benchmarks, CEN
on the one hand and CIN as ownership neutrality and CON on the
other, have dominated the debate on international tax policy for fifty
years.  Thus, for many noneconomists, the central international tax
policy debate of the last half century—should states attempt to
achieve CEN or CIN—has been a debate between the two concep-
tions of competitiveness—locational neutrality and ownership neu-
trality—described in this Article.
Viewed in this way, the rhetoric of taxation and competitiveness
foreshadowed the introduction of ownership considerations into the
economic literature on international taxation.  That issue, which is to-
day an issue of widespread debate among economists and economi-
cally sophisticated writers about international taxation, is most often
referred to by the acronym CON.  For years, the economics profession
89 Id.
90 See 1991 Competitiveness Report, note 4, at 243-48 (comparing CEN to CIN without
considering CON).
91 Id. at 232-68.
92 Id. at 247-48.
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ignored or rejected the idea that taxation could reduce welfare by dis-
torting ownership.  Economists now widely recognize that taxation
can reduce welfare by distorting ownership.  In general, the critics of
pursuing CON argue not that distorting ownership has no adverse
welfare consequences.  Instead, they typically argue that locational
distortions are more—and perhaps much more—important.  In other
words, the non-economists were telling the economists something—
ownership matters—but the economics profession was not listening.
D. Who Is Us?
The two ways of describing how international taxation affects com-
petitiveness also tracks a debate from twenty years ago between two
prominent academics that still resonates today.  The debate took place
between Robert Reich and Laura D’Andrea Tyson, both of whom
would soon become members of President Clinton’s cabinet.  In 1990,
Reich, who would later become Secretary of Labor in the Clinton Ad-
ministration, published an article in the Harvard Business Review, en-
titled Who Is Us?93  The article begins with a rhetorical question,
“[a]cross the United States, you can hear calls for us to revitalize our
national competitiveness.  But wait—who is ‘us’?”94
Reich’s answer was as follows:
Typically, the assumed vehicle for improving the competitive
performance of the United States is the American corpora-
tion—by which most people would mean Corporation A.
But today, the competitiveness of American-owned corpora-
tions is no longer the same as American competitiveness.  In-
deed, American ownership of the corporation is profoundly
less relevant to America’s economic future than the skills,
training, and knowledge commanded by American work-
ers—workers who are increasingly employed within the
United States by foreign-owned corporations.
So who is us?  The answer is, the American work force, the
American people, but not particularly the American corpo-
ration.  The implications of this new answer are clear:  if we
hope to revitalize the competitive performance of the United
States economy, we must invest in people, not in nationally
defined corporations.  We must open our borders to inves-
tors from around the world rather than favoring companies
that may simply fly the U.S. flag.  And government policies
93 Robert B. Reich, Who Is Us?, Harv. Bus. Rev., Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 53.
94 Id.
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should promote human capital in this country rather than as-
suming that American corporations will invest on “our” be-
half.  The American corporation is simply no longer “us.”95
Looked at through the lens of investment policy, Reich is arguing
that U.S. policy should not seek to promote U.S. corporate champi-
ons, but should instead encourage investment into the United States
in order to raise U.S. wages.  It is, thus, not surprising that Reich is
critical of tax policies that discourage foreign investment into the
United States as the following passage illustrates:
In July 1989, for instance, the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee voted to apply a withholding capital gains tax to for-
eigners who own more than 10% of a company’s shares.
Another provision of the committee would scrap tax deduct-
ibility for interest on loans made by foreign parents to their
American subsidiaries.  A third measure would limit R&D
tax credits for foreign subsidiaries.  More recently, Congress
is becoming increasingly concerned about foreign takeovers
of American airlines.  A subcommittee of the House Com-
merce Committee has voted to give the Transportation De-
partment authority to block foreign acquisitions.
These policies make little sense—in fact, they are counter-
productive.  Our primary concern should be for training and
development of the American work force, not the protection
of the American-owned corporation.  Thus, we should en-
courage, not discourage, foreign direct investment.96
Viewed in terms of the two definitions of competitiveness discussed
earlier, Reich is arguing that we should reject the first definition,
which defines competitiveness in terms of the performance of U.S.-
based companies, and adopt the second definition, which defines com-
petitiveness in terms of domestic wages, which are closely related to
the ability to attract foreign investment.  Viewed in terms of the de-
bate over what tax policy benchmark the United States should pursue,
Reich is explicitly rejecting the notion of equating U.S. competitive-
ness with CON or CIN as ownership neutrality and advocating instead
associating it with CEN.97
95 Id. at 54.
96 Id. at 63.
97 Although Reich is a strong proponent of defining competitiveness in terms of domes-
tic workers and not in terms of domestic-owned companies, it is worth mentioning that he
recognizes at least implicitly that government policies can distort ownership and that such
policies can be detrimental to the welfare of the host state.  Reich continues the discussion
above as follows:
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Tyson, Reich’s opponent in the debate, would later chair President
Clinton’s Council of Economic Advisors.  In 1991, Tyson published a
response, entitled They Are Not Us:  Why American Ownership Still
Matters.98  Although she raises several caveats and does not discuss
tax policy, Tyson, as the subtitle of her article states, advances an own-
ership view of competitiveness.  She writes:  “Despite several decades
of substantial foreign direct investment by U.S. multinationals, the
competitiveness of the U.S. economy remains tightly linked to the
competitiveness of U.S. companies.”99  And after a review of the evi-
dence on globalization as of about twenty years ago, Tyson concludes:
Unlike Reich, I read the evidence as proving a strong, con-
tinuing link between American companies and the vitality of
the U.S. economy.  Who is us?  American companies still
are.  And while foreign firms represent bigger shares of the
domestic economy, especially in a few major industries, they
are still not as important as American firms.  “They are not
yet us, although they are beginning to bear a strong family
resemblance.  And for national defense purposes, they will
never be just like us.”100
Tyson goes on to discuss policy, but nowhere does she discuss tax
policy.  She generally agrees with Reich on broad policy agendas, such
as education and job creation, and puts a heavy reliance on reciprocity
as a tool to open foreign markets.101 She also concedes that Reich
might be right for the future, but Tyson is clearly arguing that owner-
ship matters and that U.S. government policy should to some extent
support U.S.-owned firms.  Thus, she concludes:
Engine Charlie Wilson [the president of GM who famously
said “what is good for GM is good for America”] may have
been right for the 1950s, and Robert Reich might well be
Experience shows that foreign-owned companies usually displace American-
owned companies in just those industries where the foreign businesses are sim-
ply more productive.  No wonder America’s governors spend a lot of time and
energy promoting their states to foreign investors and offer big subsidies to
foreign companies to locate in their states, even if they compete head-on with
existing American-owned businesses.
Id. at 63.
98 Laura D’Andrea Tyson, They Are Not Us:  Why American Ownership Still Matters,
Am. Prospect 37, Winter 1991, at 37.
99 Id. at 38.
100 Id. at 47.
101 Id. at 48-49.
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right for the next century.  But, for now, we need to impro-
vise in a world that fits no ideal model.102
Thus, Tyson’s position is closely associated with the first definition
of competitiveness, which focuses on ownership of assets by U.S.-
based businesses.  Although she is not choosing between benchmarks,
her argument clearly implies that it would be a mistake to reject CON
outright.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the term “competitiveness” has been invoked for decades
in debates about economic policy and has been applied to a wide
range of issues, it continues to attract the ire of economists.  Twenty
years ago, Krugman called competitiveness a dangerous obsession.103
He argued that policymakers and politicians were flat wrong when
they said or implied that nations were in direct economic competition
with one another so that one nation’s gain would come only at an-
other’s loss.104  That obsession is dangerous, he contended, because it
tends to redirect policymakers and politicians away from the largely
domestic policies that have the potential to improve living standards
and towards punitive international policies that would benefit no one
and likely harm many.105  In the context of international taxation,
however, competitiveness is not generally used as a justification for
punitive tax policies.
In debates over international taxation, the term “competitiveness”
is generally used in two distinct ways.  The first is in terms of the abil-
ity of companies from different nations to compete against one an-
other to acquire assets in a specific location.  The second is in terms of
the ability of a nation to attract capital.  Moreover, although econo-
mists have long appreciated the value to a state of attracting invest-
ment and the role of regulatory arbitrage, until recently the economics
profession did not appreciate the welfare consequences of ownership.
For years, after Horst redirected the economics profession from view-
ing CIN as dealing with competitiveness to viewing it as dealing with
savings, noneconomists raised the issue of how taxes affect ownership
using the rhetoric of competitiveness.
Both ways of thinking about the connection between taxation and
competitiveness are intuitive and both are based on conceptions of
competitiveness that have deep roots in the economics literature going
102 Id. at 49.
103 Krugman, note 2, at 28-30.
104 Id. at 30.
105 Id.
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back for many years.  Moreover, the two conceptions of competitive-
ness closely match prominent positions in longstanding debates about
economic policy, including international taxation.  The first approach
is consistent with advocacy of CON (alternatively with advocacy of
CIN as ownership neutrality), whereas the second approach is consis-
tent with advocacy of CEN.  Accordingly, the first approach is often
invoked to lower the domestic tax rate on foreign source income,
whereas the second approach is often employed to justify lowering tax
rates on domestic source income.  The second approach is also used to
argue for worldwide taxation.  The two conceptions also match up
with the positions taken by Reich and Tyson in the Who Is Us? de-
bate.  The first approach, with its emphasis on ownership of invest-
ment, tracks the position taken by Tyson, whereas the second, with its
emphasis on the location of investment, tracks the position taken by
Reich.
Competitiveness may be a dangerous obsession and the hot button
issue in debates about international tax policy, but it need not be an
incoherent concept.  There is no need to choose between engaging in
economic analysis and talking about competitiveness.  By carefully de-
fining what is meant by competitiveness and by thoroughly examining
how international taxation affects a well-defined conception of com-
petitiveness, the connection between taxation and competitiveness
can be rigorously studied.  International tax policies could then be for-
mulated after giving proper consideration to the impact of alternative
policies on competitiveness.
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